The "Weakest Link" has proved to be a successful television game show in a number of countries. In each round the team of contestants are asked questions in turn and the amount the team can win goes up as the chain of correctly answered questions increases. If a question is answered incorrectly, then all the money built up in the chain is lost. Each contestant can decide to "bank" the money before hearing their next question and then the chain starts from 0 again. There is an upper limit on the amount that can be won in each round and the length of time of the round, (as well as the number of contestants) goes down from round to round. The decision of which team member is voted off at each round -"the weakest link"-gives the game its name but there is little science, some psychology and lots of prejudice in that decision. The decision of when to bank though can be treated rationally though the contestants rarely seem to make such rational decisions.
In the next section the problem of when to bank is formulated as a dynamic programming problem and the optimal strategy identified. The formulation works for all the versions of the game but we give the results for the UK tea-time version of the game where the chain's value goes £0, £20, £50, £100, £200, £300, £450, £600, £800 and £1000. We then examine the myopic strategy of deciding whether or not to bank by considering what maximises the value after one more question. This could be considered the strategy that is individually rational. Finally we examine what happens if a contestant is arrogant (or modest) and believes they are more (or less) likely to answer a question correctly than the other contestants.
OPTIMAL STRATEGY
Suppose the maximum you can earn in each round is M and the value of banking after a chain of i correct answers is c i where 0=c o < c 1 < c 2 < c 3 < c 4 < c 5 < c 6 < c 7 < c 8 <c 9 =M. Assume that there are N questions available in the current round. The rounds are of a given time, and the length of time to ask and answer a question are closely distributed around 7.5 secs. Hence it is reasonable to assume that there are a known number of questions in each round. To solve the problem one needs to estimate p, the probability of the team answering each question . We assume this is the same for each question asked and that the team members have a good estimate for it when making their decisions about banking.
Thus at any point in a round, the state of the game is given by ( n, i, b) where n is the number of questions still to be asked in that round, i is the number of questions correctly answered so far in the current chain and b is the amount banked in the round. The objective is to maximise the expected amount banked by the end of the round. Let that be V(n,i,b) if the current state is (n,i,b). Then V( n,i, b) satisfies the following optimality equation 1 ,
The first term is the result of banking now so that b+c i is in the bank ( provided it does not exceed M) and then the next question is correctly answered with probability p or incorrectly answered with probability 1-p. The second term is what happens if the there is no banking at this stage. With probability p the run increases to i+1 correctly answered questions while with probability 1-p the next answer is wrong and the chain reverts to 0 correctly answered questions.
Once can solve this equation using a spreadsheet and the results for the UK example are as follows Example: UK where c o =0, c 1 =20, c 2 =50, c 3 =100, c 4 =200, c 5 =300, c 6 =450, c 7 =600, c 8 =800, c 9 =M=1000. N= 25 for (180 sec rounds) down to 15 for (110sec round)
The expected payoffs in the cases N=15,20 and 25 are given below as p varies. The optimal strategy obviously varies depending on the probability, p, of getting the questions correct. If p=0.6 ( and any lower value of p), the optimal strategy is to bank at £20 in a chain ( i.e. after each correctly answered question) no matter how much is This structure of banking earlier in the chain the more one has in the bank also occurs when p=0.8 but in this case the point at which one stops the chain varies from £800 to £20. One banks at £800 if one has £0 already in the bank and only 3 questions left while if one only has 1 question left one would bank at £800 if the current amount is £230 or less. With 25 questions to go, the following strategy is optimal. One would bank at £300 if one had £60 or less in the bank already; one would bank at £200 if one already had between £70 and £500 in the bank ; one would bank at £100 if between £510 and £580 in the bank; one would bank at £50 if one had between £590 and £630
and thereafter one would bank at £20.
One might expect the banking strategy to have some obvious monotone properties .
Formally if the game is at stage (n,i,b, ) ( n questions to go i correct answers in the chain so far and b in the bank) one might expect that if one banks at ( n,i,b) one might also want to bank at (n, i+1, b), so one gets more conservative the longer the chain.
One might also think one banking at (n,i,b) means one wants to bank at (n+1,i,b) in that having an extra question to go should not make you want to take more risks. One might also expect that if one banks at ( n,i,b) one would also want to bank at (n,i,b+a) so the more one has in the bank already the more conservatively one should play . In fact the first two conjectures are incorrect as the following two counter examples show Example 1: Not conservative in i With p=.6, then at state (1, 2,500) one banks and so expects to get 562, (i.e. 550 + 0.6(20) +0.4(0)) , rather than 560, ( i.e.500 +0.6 (100)). At (1,3,500) one does not bank since one expects 620 ( i.e.500 + 0.6(200) ), rather than the 612 (i.e. 600
+0.6(20) ) if one banks).
Example 2: Not conservative in n.
Again with p=0.6 as described above one should bank at ( 1, 2,500). At ( 2, 2,500) 
Consider what this suggests in the following three examples Example: UK early evening.
In this c 1 =20, c 2 =50, c 3 =100, c 4 =200, c 5 =300, c 6 =450, c 7 =600, c 8 =800, c 9 =M=1000. In this case c 1 =100, c 2 =250, c 3 =500, c 4 =2000, c 5 =2500, c 6 =2250, c 7 =3000, c 8 =4000, c 9 =M=5000. Since all these levels are five times the early evening equivalent, the results are exactly the same and contestant should only bank at £100, £1000, £2250 or £4000 depending on their beliefs about getting a question correct.
Example US
In this case c 1 =$1000, c 2 =$2500, c 3 =$5000, c 4 =$10000, c 5 =$25000, c 6 =$50000, c 7 =$75000, c 8 =M=$125000.
In this case one should only bank at $1000 ( if one believes p<0.66) or $50000 ( if one believes 0.666<p<0.6756). Otherwise one goes all the way to $125000.
The question arises of how good is this strategy? One can calculate the value under this strategy by using equation 1 but where we use the banking policy specified rather than the banking decision that gives the maximum value ( i.e. if in the UK example if we believe p=0.7 then we bank at £200 and do no bank before). The difference between the expected reward under the optimal policy and this myopic policy is shown in Figure 2 for the case of 15, 20 and 25 question rounds and all the various choices of probability p. For low p, the myopic policy of banking at £20 is also the optimal policy and there is no difference in expected total rewards. The major differences occur when the myopic policy changes from one banking level, so for example at p=0.816 it suggests banking at £800 while at p=0.817 it suggests banking at £1000. Given that the state of the game is ( n, i, b) and one believes the team answers each question correctly with probability p, what is the probability of answering the next question correctly that makes one decide not to bank. We call this the arrogance probability a(n,i,b,p), and it is the probability value which means it is equally valid to bank or not bank. If one believes one's chance of getting the question correct is less than this value one should bank and if one believes it is more than this value then one
should not bank. Assuming V(n,i,b,p) is the solution to equation(1) with probability p used, then a(n,i,b,p) satisfies
For p=0.7 and n=15, Table 1 gives the values of a(15,i,b,0.7) as i and b vary, (na means it is not appropriate to have a value in this case as the total one can get in the round already exceeds M). The table shows that if the current run is only at £20 then someone using this strategy is willing to risk trying the question even if they feel they only have a slightly over 50% chance of getting it correct. On the other hand if the current run is worth £450 they will only risk going for the question if they are 80% or more sure of getting it correct. Essentially they can be modest and go for the question without banking even if they believe their chance of getting it right is below the other contestant's average of 0.7 if there is £100 or less in the current run. If there is more than this available in the current run, they should be arrogant and only risk not banking if they believe they are much more likely to get it right than the others. This form of the result holds for almost all the choices of n and p that are likely to arise.
CONCLUSIONS
Dynamic programming analysis shows that the optimal banking strategy is quite different from that displayed by the contestants. Whether this difference is due to contestants' selfishness, arrogance or inability to assess the chances of answering
questions correctly is open to debate.
